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The aim of this thesis is to make a first attempt to establish why Member States decide 
to send observations to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) in the 
preliminary reference procedure. There is a strong debate in the academic literature 
about the degree to which the CJEU can further European integration, independent of 
the preferences of the Member States. Earlier research has conceptualised the 
observations that Member States submit in proceedings before the Court as threats from 
the Member States to override the Court or to not comply with its ruling. The debate is 
about how credible these threats are. In contrast, legal scholars believe that the 
observations can have an influence based on the soundness of the arguments they use. 
 This thesis will turn the focus away from the Court and toward the Member State 
governments. This will enhance the understanding of the complex relationship between 
the EU Member States and the Court of Justice, thus informing the theoretical debate. 
The analysis is based on interviews with civil servants in the Netherlands and Sweden.  
 The empirical finding of this thesis is that Member States submit observations to 
defend national interests, legislation, and policies. Moreover, the civil servants have a 
very lawyerly view of the whole process. They talk about ‘winning’ cases, some describe 
themselves as barristers, and they believe legal argumentation and legally relevant 
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In European integration studies the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter 
CJEU or Court) has often been portrayed as a mighty institution pushing European 
integration ever further.1 In this telling, the Court can push through its preference for 
deeper integration independently of the wishes of the Member States. However, recently 
a fierce academic debate2 has broken out over the degree to which the Court has leeway 
to do this. The main empirical question in this debate is to what extent the written 
observations that Member States submit in proceedings before the Court affect the 
Court’s decisions. In short, the question is whether the preferences of the Member 
States, as expressed in their written observations, restrict the Court’s room for 
manoeuvre. Thus, these scholars have tried to figure out how the Court reacts to the 
observations of the Member States and why it does so. In contrast, the question why 
Member States choose to submit these observations has received scant attention. It is 
this gap in the literature that this thesis seeks to contribute to filling. However, before 
getting to that, it is necessary to explain the debate referred to above a little further.  
The debate on the degree of autonomy of the Court reached a new level of 
intensity with the publication of Carruba, Gabel, and Hankla (2008). Carruba, Gabel, and 
Hankla studied all CJEU cases between 1987 and 1997 and concluded that the 
observations of the Member States systematically influence the Court’s rulings. They 
propose two theoretical explanations for this finding: legislative override and 
noncompliance. Legislative override means that the Member States would undo the 
effects of a ruling with new legislation. Similarly, one or more Member States could 
simply not comply with the Court’s ruling. The Court fears such an open confrontation 
with the Member States, the theory goes, as this would harm its legitimacy and reverse 
its decision. Nevertheless, it has not been studied whether civil servants in the Member 
States also see their actions as part of a larger legal-political strategy in which the 
observations are a first step that can be followed by legislation. 
 In response to Carruba, Gabel, and Hankla, Stone Sweet and Brunell argue3 that 
the CJEU is not constrained by the Member States in its decision-making. In their view, 
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the Member States will never manage to override the Court because of the many veto 
players and consensus requirements in the European legislative process. There will 
almost always be enough Member States that support the Court’s ruling to prevent an 
override. Moreover, Stone Sweet and Brunell argue that Member State noncompliance is 
not possible because the other Member States will coalesce to punish the noncompliant 
Member State, and because national courts will not accept the governments’ 
noncompliance with EU-law. So, even though the observations can be conceptualised as 
threats of override or noncompliance, these threats are not credible and thus ineffective. 
Therefore, the Court is free to further European integration as it sees fit.4 However, if the 
observations of the Member States have no impact, why would the Member States spend 
time and energy on writing and submitting them? This question remains unanswered. 
 A third perspective on the role of the Court in European integration comes from 
legal scholarship. In a simple version of this perspective, the Court is motivated by a 
desire to find the correct solution to the cases before it and not by any political agenda.5 
Grimmel6 presents a more sophisticated view. He argues that rationalism is not 
universal and that the rationalism that is at work in political processes is different from 
that in law. In other words, the context of the law determines which arguments are valid, 
not actors’ interests or political preferences. In this view, the observations mainly have 
influence through the soundness of their legal arguments. Moreover, Member States are 
‘repeat players’ that are regularly before the Court. Therefore, they have an interest in 
long-term rule change, as opposed to just the outcome of an individual case. The 
relevant question for this thesis is whether the civil servants in the Member States see 
argumentation and persuasion as the main channels through which the Court can be 
influenced and whether they behave according to the repeat player model. 
The questions presented above with regard to the different theoretical 
approaches have not been answered in literature. There has been little research into 
these issues, and the answers that have been presented are rather vague and broad. For 
instance, Granger states that: “One can distinguish between three types of motivations 
for governmental policies in preliminary reference proceedings: the defence of domestic 
or national interests, the promotion of national visions of Europe and the furthering of 
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EU interests.”7 However, what counts as a domestic or EU interest worth defending is 
not specified. This thesis will seek to address this gap in the literature. 
 
1.1. Aim and research question 
Consequently, the aim of this thesis is to make a first attempt to establish why Member 
States decide to send observations to the CJEU in the preliminary reference procedure. 
This will enhance the understanding of the complex relationship between the EU 
Member States and the Court of Justice, thus informing the theoretical debate.  
 Unfortunately, it is not possible in this thesis to study all 28 EU Member States. 
Therefore, a selection has to be made. This thesis studies two Member States: the 
Netherlands and Sweden. This choice is explained in the methodology chapter below. 
This selection leads to the following research question: Why do civil servants in the 
Swedish and Dutch governments decide to submit observations to the CJEU? To help 
answer this question, the following sub-questions need to be answered: 
1. How is the decision-making about submitting observations to the CJEU organised 
in Sweden and the Netherlands? 
2. What factors are considered by the Dutch and Swedish civil servants when they 
have to decide about submitting observations to the CJEU? 
3. What are the objectives that Swedish and Dutch civil servants seek to achieve 
with their observations and what do they believe their effect is on the rulings of 
the Court? 
 
The main method used in this thesis to find an answer to these questions is face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews. In addition, some documents will be used for triangulation 
purposes. The main reason for using interviews is that the questions in this study deal 
with the perspectives of individual civil servants. The most straightforward way to find 
out what these perspectives are is simply to ask the civil servants concerned. Therefore, 
interviews are the best method for answering the questions this thesis poses. 
 In the next chapter an overview will be given of the previous literature and 
theory relevant to this thesis. This chapter will situate this Master’s thesis in the broader 
field of European studies and explain its contribution to the existing literature. 
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2. The Court and European Integration: Previous 
Research and Theory 
 
In this chapter the theories that are most relevant for this thesis will be outlined. 
Moreover, the preliminary reference procedure, which is central to this thesis, will be 
explained. Finally, an overview of the previous literature that deals with the subject 
matter of this thesis will be given. 
 
2.1. European integration theory  
The two schools of thought that have dominated the study of European integration are 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. These theories differ strongly on why 
European integration happens and which actors are the most important in the process. 
Understanding these theories is important to understand the debate about the role of 
the CJEU in European integration and its relationship with the Member States. However, 
this chapter is not intended to be a detailed review of the vast body literature in this 
field, but rather as a brief explanation of the core elements of both theories. For reasons 
of clarity, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism will be discussed in turn. 
 Neofunctionalism was first presented in 1958 by Haas.8 According to Haas and 
later neofunctionalists European integration happens because of the unforeseen 
consequences of earlier steps. More specifically, they posit that integration in one sector 
leads to ‘spillover effects’ in sectors that are closely related to the sector that was 
integrated first. The spillover effects create incentives for integration in the related 
sectors. Thus, the scope of integration keeps expanding from one sector to the next. A 
recent example of this can be found in the Eurozone crisis. Integration of monetary 
policy led to spillover effects in the fields of banking and budgetary policy. These policy 
areas were integrated more deeply in response. 
However, this process of spillover effects leading to more integration is not seen 
as automatic by neofunctionalists. Rather, it is pushed forward by supranational actors, 
such as the Commission and the CJEU, who are the engines of the integration process. 
Supranational actors are able to play this role because they operate in a technocratic 
sphere, isolated from everyday politics. The theory is that politicians are not very 
concerned with technical issues and are focussed on the short term because they want 
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to be re-elected. In contrast, the supranational actors use the space that this disinterest 
of the politicians creates to further integration in the long run. Furthermore, the 
supranational institutions choose to play this role as engines of integration because 
more integration gives them more power. In addition, the supranational actors can find 
allies in subnational actors, such as business groups. These groups feel the spillover 
effects and have an interest in integration. Together, the supranational and subnational 
actors can pull unwilling national governments along on the road to further integration. 
Intergovernmentalism offers an entirely different explanation for European 
integration. This theory was introduced by Hoffmann9 and was most notably developed 
by Moravcsik.10 In this theory, the Member States foresee the consequences of the 
treaties they sign, so there are no unforeseen spillover effects. Rather, integration 
happens when the economic interests of the Member States in a specific policy area 
converge. An additional explanatory factor is the issue-specific relative bargaining 
power of the Member States. In short, Germany can demand more concessions from 
Belgium than vice versa, and a State that wants something very badly is prepared to 
compromise in other areas in order to get it. Therefore, the most important actors are 
the Member State governments.  
In this theory, the supranational institutions are set up to ensure compliance of 
the Member States with their Treaty obligations. In addition, the Treaties cannot cover 
all issues in detail, so the supranational institutions also can have a role in working out 
the details. However, these institutions have no independent power to further 
integration beyond what the Member States are willing to accept. To return to the 
example of the Eurozone crisis, an intergovernmentalist argument would be that the 
interests of the Member States converged on the formation of a Banking Union. The 
Member States with large financial sectors had a strong interest in the negotiations and 
shaped the architecture of the Banking Union. The European Central Bank was then 
appointed as the regulator and supervisor to ensure compliance and to develop the 
precise regulations. Intergovernmentalists would argue that the CJEU fulfils a similar 
role in the EU, helping to ensure compliance with the Treaties, but not able to push 
integration beyond what Member States are willing to accept. 
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2.2. The preliminary reference procedure in European law 
Before we turn to the debate about the role of the Court in European integration, a short 
outline of the preliminary reference procedure11 is necessary. The core of this procedure 
is that national courts can, and in some cases must, refer questions about the 
interpretation of European law to the CJEU. In other words, if a question of European 
law arises before a national court, the national court stays the proceedings, sends 
questions to the CJEU, and waits for the answer before making a final ruling in the case. 
This procedure is intended to ensure unity in the interpretation of European law within 
the Union. The questions that Member State courts refer often concern the compatibility 
of a specific national rule with EU law. In theory, the CJEU only explains how the relevant 
rules of EU law should be interpreted. However, as Craig and De Búrca point out, the 
Court often gives a ruling that leaves the national court little discretion and thus 
effectively strikes down national legislation.12 In addition, the CJEU has developed some 
of the most important principles of EU law in cases in the preliminary reference 
procedure. For this reason, legal scholars often regard this procedure as of “seminal 
importance for the development of EU law.”13  
 This combination of the CJEU striking down national rules and simultaneously 
developing important principles of EU law serves to make the preliminary reference 
procedure very important for the Member States. Conveniently, the Member States can 
submit observations in preliminary reference cases before the Court.14 This means that 
in every case every Member State has the possibility to tell the Court how they think the 
case should be decided. To enable Member States to do that, the Court notifies them of 
incoming cases. The deadline for submission of Member State observations is two 
months after the notification by the Court. What the effect of these observations is on the 
Court’s decisions is the subject of a strong academic debate.  
 
2.3. The Court and the Member States 
There are broadly speaking three schools of thought on the role of the Court in European 
integration, and its relationship with Member State governments. Two of these are 
basically sub-theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism and one, referred 
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to here as legalism, comes from legal scholarship. All three theories come under various 
names while the core ideas remain the same, for instance intergovernmentalism is 
sometimes referred to as “neo-realism,”15 or the “separation of powers model,”16 and 
neofunctionalism is also referred to as “supranationalism,”17 or the “attitudinal model.”18 
For the purpose of terminological consistency, this thesis will use neofunctionalism, 
intergovernmentalism, and legalism for the Court-specific theories. 
 Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism share some basic assumptions 
about the Court that legalism does not share. These assumptions are that the Court is a 
unitary, rational, and political actor.19 In other words, the Court as such has a policy 
agenda, namely further European integration, and is trying to advance this agenda as far 
as possible. The basic point of contention between neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism is how much latitude the Court has to pursue this agenda. This is 
in principle an empirical question: can the Member States constrain the Court?20 
 
2.3.1. Intergovernmentalism  
Intergovernmentalist scholars argue that the Member States have both the ability and 
the will to systematically constrain the CJEU. The idea is that the Court is not just a 
policy-seeking actor, but also concerned with its own legitimacy. For that reason, the 
Court is reluctant to engage in open confrontation with the Member States. Garrett 
explains that the Court’s actions “are fundamentally political in that they anticipate the 
possible reactions of other political actors in order to avoid their intervention.”21 These 
‘reactions’ and ‘interventions’ can come in three different forms. First of all, the Member 
States can change the Treaties in order to limit the power of the Court or undo its ruling. 
However, this is very difficult as it requires unanimity of the Member States. Therefore, 
this is very much the “nuclear option – exceedingly effective, but difficult to use – and is 
therefore (…) relatively ineffective and noncredible.”22  
Secondly, the Member States could, in their role as legislators in the Council, 
change the underlying directive or regulation to undo the undesired effects of a ruling. 
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 Alter (1998), 122 
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 Carruba, Gabel, and Hankla (2008), 449 
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 Andreas Grimmel (2011) 
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 Larsson and Naurin, forthcoming 
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 For a critical discussion of these assumptions, see Grimmel (2012) 
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This process of changing the legislation that the Court based its ruling on to undo the 
effects of that ruling is generally called ‘(legislative) override.’23 A third option open to 
one or more Member States is to simply not comply with the ruling. The noncomplying 
Member State(s) could avoid punishment, intergovernmentalists argue, if the other 
Member States agree with its opposition to the Court’s ruling.24 The Court wants to 
avoid override and noncompliance, because they damage its institutional legitimacy and 
reverse its preferred policy. Therefore, the Court will not push integration further than 
the Member States are willing to accept. However, this line of argument requires that the 
Court knows what the preferences of the Member States are.  
This is why the observations of Member States play a crucial role in 
intergovernmentalist thinking. The observations should be seen as signals of what the 
preferences of the Member States are. As such they can be conceptualised as implicit 
threats of override and noncompliance. The strength of these threats is determined by 
the amount of Member States that agree with each other and the decision-making rules 
by which an override would have to take place. Proving this argument had been 
attempted earlier,25 but the most famous empirical study supporting this argument was 
made by Carruba, Gabel, and Hankla.26 They created a dataset of all cases decided by the 
CJEU between 1987 and 1997 and coded the positions of all the active Member States. 
Carruba, Gabel, and Hankla found “systematic evidence that judges at the [CJEU] are 
sensitive to”27 the threats of override and noncompliance. 
An implicit assumption in Carruba, Gabel, and Hankla’s explanation and in 
intergovernmentalist approaches generally, is that the Member State governments are 
unitary actors. Moreover, intergovernmentalist thinking requires that Member States 
are willing to follow through with their threats of override and noncompliance and thus 
see their observations before the Court as a first step in a larger legal-political strategy 
that can later be followed by legislative steps. This implies that there is coordination 
within national governments between the actors dealing with the Court and those 
dealing with European legislation. This thesis will look into whether the officials in the 
Swedish and Dutch governments who are responsible for submitting observations see 
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their actions as part of a larger strategy that can include changes to European legislation. 
In addition, the degree of coordination between the officials dealing with the Court and 
those dealing with EU-legislation will be examined.  
In conclusion, intergovernmentalists argue that the Court can be effectively 
constrained by the Member States, if many Member States oppose a certain ruling. The 
observations function as threats of override and noncompliance that limit the Court’s 
ability to further integration. 
 
2.3.2. Neofunctionalism  
By contrast, in the neofunctionalist telling, the Court is an “unsung hero”28 of European 
integration. It has accomplished a “transformation of Europe,”29 by converting an 
international treaty into a constitution. The Court is the quintessential technocratic 
institution of Haas’ theory: powerful, operating in a technical area where the ‘mask’ of 
the law cloaks the effects of its rulings from politicians, and institutionally well-
protected against political pressure.30 Moreover, individuals and companies, pursuing 
their own interests and agendas, help the Court by bringing cases that enable the Court 
to develop European legal principles.31 A further subnational constituency of the Court is 
found in the national courts, which refer questions to the CJEU, enabling the 
development of EU law. More importantly, national courts have accepted the supremacy 
of EU law over national law and therefore enforce rulings of the CJEU against their own 
governments.32 A way of summarising the neofunctionalist view is that the CJEU is 
better seen as a trustee of the Treaty system than as an agent of the Member States.33  
Alter34 presents another factor that she argues insulates the Court from 
retaliation of the Member States. In short, the argument is that the Court has a different 
time horizon than politicians. Politicians, being focussed on their re-election, are 
interested in short term successes and for that reason care more about the outcome in 
the specific case than about the development of legal principles. Alter argues that the 
CJEU satisfies the Member States by giving them their desired outcome in specific cases 
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while developing important principles that further integration beyond what the Member 
States would prefer. This is an empirical question: do Member States care more about 
the outcome in the specific case or about the underlying principles? This is an aspect 
that will come back in the empirical chapter of this thesis. 
The fact that the Court represents such an ideal case for neofunctionalist thinking 
on supranational institutions makes the debate about the autonomy of the Court very 
important for neofunctionalism broadly. The empirical study of Carruba, Gabel, and 
Hankla thus presented a serious challenge to this theory. That is why neofunctionalist 
scholars Stone Sweet and Brunell reacted strongly.35 They argue that the Member States 
cannot constrain the Court with threats of override and noncompliance. The argument is 
that in the case of important rulings, the Member States will be divided amongst 
themselves and thus not able override a decision of the Court.36 Moreover, the Court is 
not constrained by a threat of noncompliance because the Member States will encourage 
the punishment of the noncompliant Member State. In addition, national courts play a 
role in keeping noncompliant governments in check.37 Stone Sweet and Brunell argue 
that the ineffectiveness of the threats of override and noncompliance is proven by 
Carruba, Gabel, and Hankla’s own dataset.38 As a result of the inability of the Member 
States to constrain the Court, the Court is in charge of its own zone of discretion.39  
In conclusion, in the neofunctionalist view, Member States’ observations are not 
decisive because the Member States cannot credibly threaten to override the Court or to 
not comply with its rulings. However, that leaves unanswered a question that is relevant 
for this thesis: why would Member States bother to spend time and energy writing 
observations in cases before the Court if they do not have influence?  
 
2.3.3. Legalism  
Legal scholars have a very different conceptualisation of the Court and its relationship 
with the Member States than neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist scholars. In a 
simple version of legalism, the Court is seen as first and foremost a legal actor, 
motivated by a desire to find the correct interpretation of the law, not by any political or 
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personal preferences.40 A more sophisticated view is presented by Grimmel.41 He argues 
that neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism simply transfer assumptions 
developed for political processes to the legal field, without paying attention to the 
idiosyncrasies of the legal profession. A particular point Grimmel emphasises is that, in 
his view, rationalism should not be seen as universal, but rather dependent on context. 
Grimmel argues that European law is a distinct space of reasoning, where political and 
policy arguments do not play a role. “In short, legal reasoning is not political law-
making. The context of law, not the interest of actors, tells which claims and arguments 
are legitimate and which have to be refused.”42 Therefore, the rationalism of politics 
(strategically furthering one’s policy preferences) does not apply in the legal field. 
As a consequence, legal scholars see the observations mainly as tools Member 
States can use to persuade the Court of their position.43 In other words, it is the legal 
soundness of the arguments that matters, rather than the Member States’ political force. 
Moreover, persuasion is seen by legal scholars as more effective than extra-legal means 
of influencing the Court such as override and noncompliance. This argument is 
strengthened if the Member States are conceptualised as ‘repeat players.’ The core idea 
of the repeat player theory44 is that there are two kinds of litigants: repeat players and 
‘one-shotters’. One-shotters are actors that litigate only very rarely and are interested in 
the outcome of a single case; examples could be consumers or tax payers. Repeat players 
are actors who often engage in the same kind of cases; examples could be insurance 
companies or tax agencies. Repeat players are not merely interested in the outcome in 
individual cases, but also in long-term rule change. Repeat players might even have 
policies to seek out cases that will help change the rules in their favour. They also have 
experience with litigating, in-house specialists, and larger resources. This explains why 
repeat player can use litigation to change the rules of the legal system over time. 
In the context of European law, the Member States are important repeat players. 
As such, they should be able to influence the direction of the development of EU law over 
time by being active in cases before the Court. They could learn which arguments work 
and which do not. They could use their resources to their advantage. However, a 
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problem with this perspective is that the Member States have no say in which cases 
come before the CJEU, in the context of the preliminary reference procedure. They 
cannot settle out of court if they think the case might be damaging to their long-term 
goals. It is inherent in the procedure that they have a reactive posture, responding to 
cases as they arise. Nevertheless, the idea that persuasion is the most effective way in 
which Member States can influence the Court is a very lawyerly one. As most 
government officials dealing with cases before the CJEU are likely to be lawyers, it might 
be expected that some of them will share this view. It will be investigated in the 
empirical chapter below whether that is the case. 
 
It deserves emphasis that the purpose of this thesis is not to adjudicate between the 
neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, and legalism. However, it will be examined 
whether the officials in the Dutch and Swedish governments believe their observations 
have an effect on the Court’s decision-making and why (not). This should not be 
construed as conclusive evidence on the question whether the observations have an 
impact, but it can enrich the understanding of this question to know what actors 
involved in the process think. Another way in which this thesis contributes to existing 
research is that the previous studies have mainly been based on quantitative methods, 
while this thesis uses qualitative methods.  
Moreover, nearly all of the scholars cited in this chapter sought to explain why 
the CJEU does what it does. In contrast, this thesis will add to the literature by focussing 
on the other side of the Court-Member State relationship, namely the Member State 
governments. The questions of why Member States submit observations, what their 
intent is in doing so, and how the drafting of the observations is organised in the 
Member States, have received little attention in the literature.45 However, some work in 
this field has been done. An overview of that literature will be presented below.  
 
2.4. Member states’ decision-making processes  
There is only one study that has looked at all the issues studied in this thesis: Granger 
(2004). The article touches on all the important issues, but often stays rather superficial. 
For instance, the article spends only one short paragraph on each of the questions what 
factors are considered in deciding whether or not to submit an observation and what the 
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Member States’ objectives are in submitting observations. The method used in the 
article consists of a combination of statistical analysis with analysis of governmental 
documents, interviews, questionnaires, and reports by governments’ agents involved in 
EU litigation.46 However, these documents, interviews, questionnaires, and reports are 
not cited extensively to build the argument. Especially the interviews and answers to the 
questionnaires, which in all likelihood contained the perspectives of the government 
officials, are scarcely used.  
 Despite these shortcomings the article presents some interesting findings. By 
looking at ten Member States, the article presents a good general picture of the way 
decision-making about observations is organised, what Member States take into 
account, and what their goals are. Granger distinguishes three categories of motivations 
for sending observations: “the defence of domestic or national interests, the promotion 
of national visions of Europe and the furthering of EU interests.”47 However, these 
categories are not explained much further. The interesting question is what counts as a 
national or EU interest that should be furthered or defended. The only thing the article 
contains on this question is that if national policy or legislation is directly or indirectly at 
stake, that counts as a national interest.  
A similar level of generality can be found in the description of the considerations 
in the decision-making process. These are: “the variety of interests at stake, the need for 
explanation or justification of national laws, policies or practices, the existence or 
absence of established case law, the importance or sensitive nature of the issues, the 
political or legal opportunity, the “creativity” potential of the reference or the likely 
positions of other parties.”48 Again, the interesting question is when something is 
politically or legally opportune, which interests are balanced, how they are balanced. All 
this remains open. In contrast, much more attention is paid to how things are organised 
in the different Member States. However, because the article looks at ten Member States, 
it cannot describe the process in much detail. Rather, it paints a picture in broad strokes 
of how things are organised in the different Member States. 
This thesis will seek build upon the work of Granger by looking in more detail 
into two Member States, as opposed to ten. The goal is that this leads to a more detailed 
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analysis of the considerations, the process, and the objectives of the Member States 
regarding their observations to the CJEU. Moreover, whereas Granger focussed more on 
the decision-making processes in the Member States, this thesis will also give a lot of 
attention to the considerations and objectives of the civil servants. Accordingly, there 
will be more attention to the perspectives of the interviewees on these issues. In 
addition, the categories that Granger described in very general terms will be fleshed out 
in more detail, and illustrated with examples. Moreover, new categories of 
considerations and objectives will be added.  
In addition to Granger’s article, there are several other studies that are relevant 
here. They deal with part of the subject under study in this thesis or with issues that are 
related to it. Firstly, Adam et al.49 study annulment proceedings, a different type of cases 
than are the focus of this thesis. They argue that domestic political factors can play a role 
in the decision of the Member States to sue the Commission. They argue that Member 
State governments can get an immediate populist-political reward for the act of suing, as 
they will be seen as fighting for the national interest against the bureaucrats in Brussels. 
This is an incentive to sue regardless of the chance of success. It might even be so, Adam 
et al. argue, that governments want to lose the case because it will give them a stronger 
hand to force through unpopular reforms. This idea, that political considerations can 
play a decisive role in decisions about the actions of Member State governments in 
European courts, speaks to the second sub-question in this thesis and will therefore 
come back in the empirical part of this thesis. 
 When it comes to the organisation of the decision-making around and drafting of 
the submissions an interesting study is a report commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of 
Justice.50 The researchers report that in a majority of cases “the decision whether or not 
an intervention is expedient is left to individual civil servants”51, and also note that 
“within the Ministry of Justice, the objective of an intervention isn’t recorded.”52 This 
would make it hard for the observations to be part of a legal-political strategy and thus 
seem to go against intergovernmentalist theory. However, this was a study of just one 
ministry in one Member State and it is hard to draw generalised conclusions from that. 
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In conclusion, this thesis will seek to contribute to the existing literature by turning the 
focus on the activity of the Member State governments instead of that of the Court. As 
outlined above, earlier research has sought to explain how the CJEU reacts to 
observations from the Member States, and why it does so. In contrast, the question of 
the how and why of Member State behaviour has received fairly scant attention. This is 
the gap in the literature this thesis seeks to fill. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to 
make a first attempt to establish why Member States decide to send observations to the 
CJEU in the preliminary reference procedure. The idea is that this will lead to a better 
understanding of the complex relationship between the CJEU and the EU Member States 
and thus inform the theories described in this chapter. A further contribution of this 
thesis lies in the fact that this thesis will analyse the processes in two selected Member 
States in depth as opposed to comparing many different Member States on a very 




3. Methodology: Interviews 
 
This chapter will explain the choice for semi-structured interviews as the method of this 
thesis. In addition, the selection of Sweden and the Netherlands as well as the selection 
of the ministries that are included in this study will be justified. Moreover, the 
limitations of this method will be discussed. 
 The aim and research question of this thesis concern the considerations and 
objectives of government officials. The most straightforward way to find out what these 
considerations and objectives are is simply to ask the people concerned. After all, it is 
hard to know what someone is thinking if one does not talk to them. However, in theory 
there could be very strict guidelines that stipulate when and why observations should be 
submitted. In fact, as will later be seen, some guidelines do exist. These guidelines will be 
used as tools for triangulation and to support the empirical analysis. However, 
guidelines can never fully capture the complexity of making the kinds of case-by-case 
assessments that are central to the topic under study here. Furthermore, it is always a 
question to what extent the guidelines are followed in practice. Therefore, interviews 
are the best method for finding an answer to the questions this thesis poses.  
 However, it should be noted that this line of reasoning is grounded in a positivist 
worldview. The idea is that people’s objectives and considerations are facts that are 
simply “out there,” waiting to be found.53 As this thesis deals with fairly rational and 
institutionalised decision-making processes, and does not focus on individuals’ feelings 
and emotions, this positivist view fits the subject of this thesis well. On the other hand, a 
weakness of this approach is that interviewees might not be willing to share all that they 
know or believe. However, this potential weakness is mitigated by the fact that the 
decision whether or not to submit observations is generally not very controversial 
politically.  
Nevertheless, one issue on which there was a reluctance to answer was the 
question concerning on-going cases, i.e. cases in which the decisions about the 
observation were not final yet. Originally, the idea was this thesis would follow the 
decision-making process on a few individual cases in both Sweden and the Netherlands. 
However, after a few interviews it became clear that this was not feasible as the civil 
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servants were not willing to discuss ongoing cases. For that reason the topic was not 
included in later interviews. As a result, the interviews stuck to the decision-making on a 
general level, with the addition of examples provided by the interviewees. 
 Finally, the interviews were semi-structured, as opposed to rigidly structured or 
fully open. The benefit of semi-structured interviews is that they stick to predefined 
topics and questions that are necessary to answer the research question, while 
simultaneously allowing for “openness to changes of sequence and question forms in 
order to follow up the answers given.”54 In addition, an advantage of the live interview 
format over written questionnaires is that it allows for follow-up questions if answers 
are unclear. The full interview guide can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
3.1. The preliminary reference procedure 
This thesis will only focus on the decision-making around observations of Member 
States in the preliminary reference procedure and thus exclude the interventions of 
Member States in other cases. There are three reasons for this. The first is that 
concentrating on one specific procedure enables clearer analysis because the procedure, 
and the role of the Member States, is slightly different in different procedures. For 
instance, in infringement proceedings the case is always that the Commission sues a 
Member State. Such differences would serve to confuse the analysis if the different 
procedures would all be included in this thesis. 
Secondly, the preliminary reference procedure is seen by legal scholars as 
extraordinarily important for the development of EU law, as outlined in the theory 
chapter. This should make the procedure important to the Member States, especially 
since the compatibility of national laws with EU law is often at stake. Furthermore, the 
preliminary reference procedure is by far the biggest source of cases for the Court. 
According to the Court’s latest annual report, references for a preliminary ruling 
represented between 61 and 69 percent of new cases each year between 2010 and 
2014.55 The third reason for choosing the preliminary reference procedure is that some 
of the earlier literature is also focussed on this procedure.56 This will enable the 
comparability of this thesis’s results with the earlier literature. Furthermore, this earlier 
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literature provides statistical information that is relevant for the selection of the 
Member States.  
 
3.2. Case selection I: The Netherlands and Sweden 
Since it is impossible in a Master’s thesis to interview civil servants in all the Member 
States, a selection has to be made. First the Member States should be selected, and then a 
choice has to be made about which civil servants within those countries to interview, 
those issues will be discussed in turn.  
Naturally, two Member States can never fully represent all 28 Member States. 
However, it is worth remembering that this thesis seeks to take a first in-depth look at 
the internal processes that determine whether or not Member States submit 
observations in preliminary reference cases. This thesis argues that Sweden and the 
Netherlands represent an interesting puzzle that is a good place to begin that analysis. 
The main argument for this is that these Member States are similar in many ways, but 
behave significantly differently in submitting observations to the Court. In other words, 
the patterns that seem to explain the variation in the level of activity of the Member 
States generally, cannot explain the difference in activity between Sweden and the 
Netherlands.  
 There are two ways in which to gauge how active Member States are in 
submitting observations. One way is simply to count the total number of observations 
submitted by the Member States. Naurin et al.57 present a figure outlining the number of 
observations each Member State submitted in the period 1997-2008 (see Figure 1 
below). One should note that some Member States only joined the EU in 2004 or 2007. 
That is why the red led line represents the share of the preliminary reference cases in 
which the countries submitted observations during the time that they have been 
Member States.  
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Figure 1. Number of observations 1997-2008. Source: Naurin et al. 
  
It is clear from Figure 1 that the Netherlands is very active when it comes to submitting 
observations, with only the UK being more active. In contrast, Sweden ranks in the 
middle. However, as Naurin et al. point out, Member States are more likely to submit 
observations on cases coming from their own country. This is logical as the Member 
State from which the case arises is most directly affected by its outcome. Therefore, part 
of the explanation might lie in the fact that Dutch courts submit many more questions 
for preliminary ruling than Swedish courts do.58  
For that reason, a second way to gauge the level of activity of the Member States 
is to look at the frequency with which they submit ‘external observations’, i.e. 
observations in cases arising in another Member State. This is presented in Figure 2, also 
taken from Naurin et al.. Again the Netherlands ranks among the most active Member 
States. Sweden, in contrast, is the least active old Member State, barring Luxembourg.  
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Figure 2. Number of external observations 1997-2008. Source: Naurin et al. 
 
As can be gauged from the two figures above, there are some factors that seem to 
explain some of the variation in the level of activity of the Member States. Firstly, bigger 
Member States are generally more active than smaller Member State. This might be a 
consequence of the amount of resources that are available. Additionally, bigger Member 
States represent bigger markets. This makes it more worthwhile for companies to sue 
for the removal of trade barriers, which leads to more references from those countries 
and thus more observations.59 A second pattern is that older Member States are 
generally more active than newer ones. However, these patterns cannot explain the 
differences between Sweden and the Netherlands, as they are similar in both those 
respects. The Netherlands and Sweden are both medium-sized Member States, 
respectively ranking eighth and fourteenth in population size,60 and seventh and eighth 
in GDP.61 Furthermore, Sweden and the Netherlands are both old Member States, in the 
sense that they were part of the EU before the enlargement of 2004.  
Based on those patterns, the Netherlands and Sweden could have been expected 
to submit roughly the same amount of observations. However, as is clear from the 
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figures above, this is not the case. The Netherlands submits more observations than 
might be expected, while Sweden submits less than expected. This is why Sweden and 
the Netherlands are contrasting cases and thus suitable Member States for this thesis.  
  
3.3. Case selection II: The ministries 
There are normally several ministries involved in the deciding on, and writing of the 
observations. The Foreign Affairs ministry is involved in every case, as is the ministry or 
ministries to whose policy area the specific case belongs.62 In the process, civil servants 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs play the role of agents of the Member States, officially 
submitting the observations and arguing at the oral hearings. This means that they have 
a lot of knowledge about their Member State’s dealings with the Court. The ministry or 
ministries whose policy areas are affected by the case are mainly responsible for 
deciding if the Member State should get involved and defining what the government’s 
position in the case should be. These different perspectives are both relevant for this 
thesis. Therefore, it is necessary to interview civil servants at both the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and other ministries, in both Sweden and the Netherlands.  
 The question then is which ministries besides the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
should be included in this thesis. Naturally, it should be the same ministries in Sweden 
and the Netherlands, to ensure comparability. As referenced earlier, the original idea 
was to follow some ongoing cases and talk to all actors involved in those cases. However, 
as this proved impossible, a different way of selecting the other ministries became 
necessary. In the event, the first interviews were conducted at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs in Sweden. The other ministries were selected by asking the first interviewees 
which Swedish ministries had recently been relatively active in the submitting of 
observations and which policy areas this activity concerned. The answer was that this 
had been the Ministry of the Environment and Energy with environmental issues and 
the Ministry of Finance as it relates to taxation. 63 Consequently, interviews were also 
conducted with civil servants at the corresponding ministries in the Netherlands. In 
total, eleven civil servants were interviewed for this thesis. Figure 3 presents the 
number of interviewees for each ministry.64 
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Ministries by Member State Number of interviewees 
Sweden 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 4 
Ministry of the Environment and Energy 1 
Ministry of Finance 1 
The Netherlands  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment 1 
Ministry of Finance  1 
Figure 3. Number of interviewees per ministry 
 
To ensure their cooperation, the interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. Therefore, 
they will be referred to in this thesis simply as ‘interviewee’ followed by a number and 
the ministry at which they work. A full list can be found in Appendix 2. Moreover, all 
interviewees, regardless of their gender, will be referred to with female personal 
pronouns. An important caveat is that the views expressed by the interviewees are their 
personal opinions, not the positions of their respective governments or ministries. The 
interviews in the Netherlands were conducted in Dutch and those in Sweden in English.  
All interviews but one were recorded and transcribed, which contributes to the 
reliability of the data and validity of the results.65 The validity of some of the results is 
further supported by using official documents as tools for triangulation. The documents 
included in this thesis are guidelines that outline the role that different parts of the 
government play in the process and what the criteria are for submitting observations. 
However, it should be noted that the guidelines used in the Netherlands are much more 
detailed and extensive, as will be seen in the empirical chapters. Therefore, the 
triangulation referred to above is less possible in the case of Sweden. 
 
3.4. Analytical approach 
In analysing the transcripts of the interviews and the government documents two things 
will be constantly looked for. Firstly, as was outlined above, the Netherlands and 
Sweden behave significantly differently and it is not immediately obvious why. 
Therefore, one aspect that will be looked for in the data is whether there are differences 
between Sweden in the Netherlands in the way the process of drafting observations is 
organised, or in the way that Swedish and Dutch interviewees see the observations. 
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Furthermore, there might also be differences between the different ministries, across 
Member States. Those differences will also be analysed. 
 Secondly, it will constantly be analysed how the answers of the interviewees 
relate to the theories. For instance, neofunctionalism predicts that Member States are 
mostly interested in the outcome in the specific case because politicians have a short 
term interest to get re-elected. If it turns out that the interviewees are very much 
concerned with long term legal developments, this would go against neofunctionalism. 
Similarly, intergovernmentalism sees the observations as threats of override and 
noncompliance. This would mean that after the Court rules, the Member States would 
try to change the underlying EU-legislation or not comply. It is a question how the civil 
servants in the Member States see this. If they do not consider overriding the Court a 
possibility that would show that at least the Member States do not think of observations 
as a first step in a strategy that can include legislative steps. Finally, legalism sees 
Member States as repeat players who seek long term rule change through action before 
the Court. This is very much in contradiction to what neofunctionalism says. Moreover, 
according to legalism the best way to influence the Court is sound legal argumentation. 
As the interviewees are lawyers, it might be expected that they share this perspective.  
 
3.5. Limitations  
An obvious limitation of this study is that it only concerns two Member States out of 28. 
As a result, it could be that some of the results found in this thesis are not generalizable 
to the other Member States. However, as stated before, it is not possible in a Master’s 
thesis to perform an in-depth study of all Member States and there is a case to be made 
that Sweden and the Netherlands are good countries to include. A similar concern might 
be raised about which ministries are included. However, this concern should be allayed 
by the fact that the interviewees in both Sweden and the Netherlands indicated that 
their governments should be seen as unitary actors, and that this is the principle on 
which their working processes are based. In addition, the civil servants at the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs in both countries have an overview of all cases in which their 
government is involved. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that additional relevant 





4. Results  
 
In this chapter the results of this thesis will be presented. One point on terminology is in 
place here. The term ‘department’ is sometimes used for different units within 
ministries and sometimes for ministries themselves. For the purpose of terminological 
consistency ‘department’ will be used in this thesis for all different units within the 
ministries and never for the ministries as a whole.  
 
4.1. Process  
Sub-question 1. How is the decision-making about submitting observations to the CJEU 
organised in Sweden and the Netherlands? 
 
In broad strokes the process through which observations are formulated is the same in 
Sweden and the Netherlands. First, the legal department of the Foreign Ministry 
distributes the cases that come in from the CJEU to the other ministries. Those ministries 
then respond by indicating in which of the following ways they want to be involved in 
case: i) not involved, ii) following the case, i.e. receiving all the documents and 
information, but not being active, or iii) submitting an observation. So, in principle it is 
the ministry responsible for the policy area in question that decides whether or not 
there will be an observation, not the Foreign Ministry. However, if the Foreign Ministry 
thinks an issue is very important they can also push for an observation in that case, but 
this is rather the exception. 
Following the decision that submitting an observation is desirable, the Foreign 
Ministry and the ministry or ministries that want to submit an observation cooperate in 
writing the legal brief. In this drafting process the Foreign Ministry is primarily 
responsible for writing the observation, procedural matters, and ensuring that the 
observation makes European-legal sense. The other ministry or ministries is/are mainly 
responsible for defining the position that the government should take, and for providing 
the main line of reasoning, specific arguments, and the practical or policy context of the 
questions at hand. Some Swedish interviewees summed up this distribution of labour by 
describing the civil servants at the Foreign Ministry as the ‘barristers’ for the others.66 
Finally, the civil servants in the Foreign Ministry submit the observation and represent 
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the Member State at the oral hearing. Both Sweden and the Netherlands in principle go 
to the oral hearing if they have submitted observations.67  
 However, if one takes a more detailed look, there are differences between 
Sweden and the Netherlands. In the first step, when the Foreign Ministry distributes the 
cases to the other ministries, the Swedish Foreign Ministry sends the cases only to those 
ministries whose policy areas might be affected by the case.68 In contrast, in the 
Netherlands, the Foreign Ministry sends every case to every ministry and adds a note 
that states for which ministries the case is especially relevant.69 In other words, the first 
broad selection of which ministries might possibly be concerned is made by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs in Sweden, while in the Netherlands this is left up to each ministry. 
However, in both Member States all observations have to be approved by a meeting of 
representatives of all ministries, so also in Sweden all ministries can have their say.70 
In addition, in the Netherlands there is a checklist71 that is used to determine 
whether making an observation in desirable, while in Sweden this is not the case. As can 
be seen in Appendix 3, the checklist consists of 14 yes-or-no questions. The questions 
are mainly about whether the case could affect Dutch policy or legislation. This 
document is widely used in practice. For instance, in the Dutch Finance Ministry, every 
department that might be affected by the case (including the tax authority) fills out the 
entire checklist. Those lists are then collected and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
informed whether the Ministry of Finance wants to follow the case, be active, or neither. 
In principle, one ‘yes’ is enough to trigger the submission of an observation.72 Having to 
actively consider those questions for each and every case in one’s policy area might lead 
to more submissions. This could be part of the explanation why the Netherlands submits 
more observations than Sweden. However, it is impossible to know, based on the data in 
this Master’s thesis, whether such a checklist has a big effect, if at all. 
A further difference is that in Sweden there is always a third entity involved 
besides the Foreign Ministry and the ministry whose policy area is affected. This entity 
is called Statsrådsberedningen in Swedish. Its official name in English is Prime Minister’s 
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Office, but this is perhaps a misleading term. It should be thought of more as an entire 
ministry than the office of the Prime Minister. In any case, the responsibility of the Prime 
Minister’s Office is to coordinate government policy across ministries. Accordingly, its 
main role in the process under study here is to have a political and strategic long term 
view, and to see what the impact can be of certain positions on policy areas that are not 
directly at issue in the case.73 As such, the Prime Minister’s Office is “the voice of 
politics”74 in the drafting process. As we will see below, political considerations can have 
an influence on the content of the observation. In Sweden, this political input can come 
through the hierarchies within ministries, or via the Prime Minister’s Office.  
 There is also a difference between Sweden and the Netherlands in the human 
resources that are available for this process. While in Sweden there are six agents at the 
Foreign Ministry,75 in the Netherlands there are eight.76 Moreover, at both the Finance 
and Environmental ministries in the Netherlands there are specific civil servants who 
are responsible for their ministry’s involvement in EU judicial proceedings, while in 
Sweden this is not the case. The specific organisation varies per ministry.  
In the Dutch Ministry of Finance, all preliminary references in Dutch taxation 
cases are handled by a specialised group of lawyers, whose main task is representing the 
government in tax proceedings before the Dutch Supreme Court. The tax cases from 
other Member States are dealt with by an EU-law specialist at the department in whose 
competence the issue falls.77 In the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment there are two specialists for the CJEU. They are responsible for all the 
cases in which the ministry is involved. Naturally, they coordinate closely with civil 
servants at the departments whose policies are affected by the case.78 However, the 
Finance ministry has more manpower available for preliminary reference cases than the 
Environment ministry in the Netherlands. This might be an explanation for the fact that 
the Finance Ministry often sends a more extensive draft to the Foreign Ministry than the 
Environment Ministry, which focusses more on outlining the main points in brief.79 
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 In the Swedish ministries studied in this thesis there are no specific specialists for 
CJEU-cases. In the Ministry of Finance, taxation cases are the responsibility of the legal 
department, within which the individual cases are assigned to civil servants in part 
based on experience with the matter at hand, and in part based on who has time. 
Moreover, the tax authority can play a role in the process.80 In the legal department of 
the Ministry of the Environment and Energy in Sweden, the cases are distributed to the 
civil servants who are responsible for the specific policy area that is at stake in the 
case.81 In sum, it should be clear that the Dutch ministries have more human resources 
available for the preliminary reference procedure than their Swedish counterparts.  
Interviewee 7 at the Swedish Ministry of Finance is aware of this, and attributes 
the fact that the Netherlands is more active in preliminary reference procedures in the 
area of taxation than Sweden to this difference in resources: “Holland and Germany are 
very active, and they have persons [who] only work with [CJEU cases], so they’re very 
active. We don’t have that kind of resources.”82 This would correspond with the pattern 
that we saw in the methodology chapter, that larger Member States, which are 
presumed to have more resources, submit more observations. Nevertheless, the 
Netherlands is not that much larger than Sweden, so it might also be a difference in 
prioritisation, or a combination of the two.  
 
4.1.1. Preliminary references and the legislative process 
The question how the observations of Member States in preliminary reference cases 
relate to EU-legislative processes is especially relevant for intergovernmentalism. 
Intergovernmentalists conceptualise the observations as threats of legislative override. 
In the theory chapter this thesis argued that it is therefore relevant to know to what 
extent civil servants in Sweden and the Netherlands see their observations as part of a 
broader strategy that can include legislative steps. Moreover, it is relevant to know to 
what extent there is coordination between the civil servants dealing with the 
observations and those responsible for EU legislation.  
As said before, preliminary references often deal directly or indirectly with the 
compatibility of national legislation with EU-law. For that reason, the civil servants who 
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negotiated the directive in question, and the civil servants who are responsible for 
implementing current EU-law might have very relevant insights. Therefore, in both 
Sweden and the Netherlands, those civil servants are involved in the process. This 
includes both civil servants with legal expertise in specific policy areas, and civil 
servants with technical expertise or practical experience. However, the specific people 
who negotiated the directive might not be available.83 Nevertheless, the intent is for the 
government to take the same position in the Court cases as it did in the negotiations. 
Thus there is close coordination between those dealing with the Court and those 
involved with EU-legislation. This coordination occurs mainly within the ministries that 
are responsible for the policy area at hand.  
When it comes to the question of a possible attempt to override the Court’s 
ruling, a first thing to note is that different ministries play different roles after the CJEU 
has delivered its judgement. The civil servants in the Foreign Ministries who deal with 
the Court are not involved in EU-legislative processes. However, they can help with 
interpreting the ruling of the Court if that is requested.84 In contrast, the legal 
departments of the other ministries, and in Sweden the Prime Minister’s Office, will be 
deeply involved in any changes to national or EU legislation.  
However, it should be noted that the first instinct of all interviewees is that if the 
Court’s ruling makes national rules incompatible with EU-law, the national rules have to 
be adjusted, rather than the EU-rules. This is very understandable when it concerns 
Treaty-interpretation because changing the Treaty is exceedingly difficult. However, the 
same initial response that national law has to be adjusted and not EU-law, came back 
when it concerned secondary EU-law. Interviewee 11 for instance says: “But in the end, 
whether we participate or not, there will be a ruling of the Court on the directive; or 
European law in any case. So, if that is not in line with your regulations then you will 
have to do something about it.”85 This idea comes back in all interviews, that if the Court 
delivers an unfavourable ruling, national laws and regulations will have to be adjusted 
accordingly. This goes against the idea of the observations as a first step that can be 
followed by legislative initiatives.  
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Nevertheless, the observations can be part of a legal-political strategy in another 
way. As EU legislation is the product of many compromises, some provisions can be 
interpreted in several ways. It is up to the CJEU to define the correct interpretation of 
such provisions. For that reason, submitting observations is seen by the interviewees as 
a way to push for the interpretation of the relevant provisions that the Member State 
advocated for in the negotiating process. Interviewee 6 mentions Article 33 of the 
REACH regulation86 as an example where the Swedish government and other 
governments have a very strong idea about how that article should be interpreted. 
When that issue reached the Court, the observations were seen as way to argue for the 
preferred interpretation.87 In this way, the observations are not a first step in a legal-
political strategy, but rather the final step in which the precise meaning of earlier 
compromises is decided. 
In conclusion, the evidence on the relationship between the preliminary 
references and EU-legislative processes is mixed. On the one hand, there is close 
coordination between the actors who deal with the Court and the actors responsible for 
EU-legislation. This could enable a larger legal-political strategy in which submitting 
observations would be a first step that can be followed by legislative action. On the other 
hand, the first impulse of the interviewees is that a negative ruling by the Court will lead 
to changes to national rules, rather than an attempt to change European rules. 
   
4.1.2. Coordination between Member States  
The question to what extent the Member States coordinate their observations is relevant 
as intergovernmentalist scholars argue that the threat of override or noncompliance is 
stronger when more Member States are active in a specific case. 
  A first note is that coordination only takes place between Member States that 
agree with each other in the specific case. The main differences on this issue are not 
between Sweden and the Netherlands, but rather between the different ministries. The 
Foreign Ministries have “a very well-functioning network among agents in the Member 
States.”88 However, the coordination is not very extensive in most cases. It is mainly 
limited to things like drawing each other’s attention to important cases89 or requesting 
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more information on the specific national regulations in question from the Member State 
from which the case originates.90 As interviewee 10 puts it: “[we do ask] ‘well, what is 
your position and are we in the same camp?’ so to say, but not ‘well, we have this 
argument are you also going to use that?’ I do try sometimes (…), [but] everyone has 
their own deadlines and their own way to go through that procedure nationally (…). So it 
is often hard [to coordinate] within those deadlines.”91 This comment and others like it92 
indicate that the time frame of 8 weeks between the Court informing the Member States 
and the deadline for submission of written observations limits the level coordination 
between the Member States in preliminary reference cases.  
However, before the oral hearing, when all the written observations are 
submitted and known to all Member States, there can be more coordination. This is 
especially the case if there are a lot of Member States involved. At this stage it is also 
fairly clear what the position of all the Member States will be because of the written 
observations. A prime incentive for coordination is that speaking time is limited to 15 
minutes per Member State. Moreover, if multiple Member States are going make very 
similar arguments it can be worth distributing them somewhat to optimise the use of the 
limited time available.93 Nevertheless, it remains the case that these are separate 
Member States who decide themselves what they are going to say.94  
When it comes to the Environment Ministries, the situation is mostly similar to 
the Foreign Ministries, with Member States mainly drawing each other’s attention to 
important cases and perhaps coordinating before the oral hearing. However, the 
interviewees at the Environment Ministries in both countries brought up two additional 
aspects of the coordination between Member States. Firstly, interviewee 11 mentioned 
that the Dutch Environment Ministry sometimes helps other Member States by 
suggesting arguments to support their case.95 However, this mainly occurs when the 
Netherlands does not itself submit an observation, be it because of a lack of resources or 
because the case is not very important for the Netherlands. In such cases it can still be 
desirable to help another Member State. However, this occurs rather rarely. In contrast, 
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when the Dutch Environment Ministry submits observations itself, there is no need to 
advise others, since all arguments can be included in the own observation.  
Secondly, interviewee 696 explained that groups of Member States can have 
ongoing discussions on important legal questions, especially if new legislation is 
adopted in which crucial provisions can be interpreted in different ways. The example 
she mentioned was Article 33 of the REACH regulation. When such an issue then reaches 
the Court, the Member States involved in those discussions have a good view of each 
other’s preferences and priorities and have had plenty of time to hone their arguments.  
Similar discussions exist between the Finance Ministries of a group of Member 
States. The specific issue at hand was the compatibility of exit taxation with the free 
movement clauses of the EU Treaties, about which there were several cases over the last 
few years, but this cooperation also extends to other issues in the field of taxation.97 This 
cooperation can be quite extensive. Firstly, interviewee 8 at the Dutch Ministry of 
Finance meets about twice a year with the Benelux countries, France, Germany and the 
UK to discuss ongoing cases.98 In addition, when an important case comes up, a meeting 
of a group of around ten Member States is organised. These meetings can take place 
either before observations are submitted or before the oral hearing. In addition, to help 
the other Member States, interviewee 8 sometimes distributes an English translation of 
the request for a preliminary ruling from the Dutch court in the case and other relevant 
documents. This can be useful because the CJEU only sends a summary of the reference 
to the Member States, which can be insufficient to fully understand the issues at hand. 
Moreover, sometimes even drafts of the observations are circulated, but because every 
Member State uses their own language, there is a language barrier here.99  
These examples of Member State coordination correspond with the repeat player 
model, as the Member States are interested in the legal development over time, rather 
than just specific cases. They also have strategies ready when such issues reach the 
Court or even coordinate across cases in order to get the desired long-term outcome.  
In sum, the coordination between the Member States is fairly limited in most 
cases. However, in very important cases in which large interests are at stake the 
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cooperation can be extensive. Nevertheless, the instances of extensive coordination 
described above are the exception rather than the rule. In addition, differences exist 
between the ministries, with the Finance Ministries being the most active in 
coordinating. 
 
4.2. Why submit observations? 
As the reader may recall, Granger found three categories of reasons why Member States 
submit observations: “the defence of domestic or national interests, the promotion of 
national visions of Europe and the furthering of EU interests.”100 This result corresponds 
with the findings in this thesis. However, the question is what counts as a national or EU 
interest worth defending through the submission of observations, in the eyes of the 
officials making these decisions. This is the question that is at is at issue in this section. 
 
4.2.1. Considerations  
Sub-question 2. What factors are considered by the Dutch and Swedish civil servants when 
they have to decide about submitting observations to the CJEU? 
 
One clear difference between the answers from the Dutch interviewees and the Swedish 
interviewees is that all the Dutch interviewees refer to the guidelines and the checklist 
when asked why the Netherlands submits observations and what is taken into 
consideration. In addition, one should note that the decisions studied here are made on a 
case-by-case basis and no argument for or against submitting an observation is 
automatically decisive. 
 However, some answers were given by all interviewees and are included in the 
checklist from the Dutch government. Firstly, if national legislation or policy is directly 
at stake because the reference comes from a court in the own Member State, Sweden 
and the Netherlands will in principle submit an observation. Secondly, an observation is 
usually submitted if the case comes from another Member State and concerns legislation 
that is similar to Dutch/Swedish legislation. This can include forthcoming national 
legislation. These two considerations are neatly summed up by interviewee 11: “the 
question then actually is: ‘could a ruling have consequences for the interests, the 
practice, the legislation, the enforcement, the supervision of your ministry?’”101 The 
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reason behind these two considerations is that the national legislation would have to be 
changed if the Court rules that it, or similar legislation, is not compatible with EU law. 
This changing of legislation takes up resources. Moreover, there might be undesirable 
policy effects or financial consequences from making national law compliant with the 
ruling. This is why interviewee 1 describes the nature of the observations as “quite 
reactive really, you try to defend already taken positions.”102  
 There are also some answers that were not given by all interviewees, but at least 
by several, across different ministries in both Sweden and the Netherlands. Some of 
these are also listed on the interdepartmental checklist in the Dutch government. One 
such a reason for submitting an observation is the degree of discretion that is left to the 
Member States.103 If a case comes up in which one of the potential ways the Court could 
rule would limit the discretion of the Member States, that can be a reason to submit an 
observation. Even if there is no specific national rule that would have to be changed, 
there is the possibility that the Member State would want to change the rules at some 
point in the future. Therefore, the Member States have an interest in keeping a degree of 
discretion. Interviewee 1 formulates this as follows: “one interest would also be (…) to 
know where the limits are (…). How far is the room for manoeuvre at the national level 
in relation to Union law? So, even though one is (…) not so sure that we want to keep 
this legislation, it would be interesting to know where the exact limits are.”104 She goes 
on to mention cases concerning monopolies as an example of this. In these cases, 
Sweden has an interest to know where the limits are for its alcohol and gambling 
monopolies. 
A further consideration is how important the issue is politically.105 This can 
influence whether or not it is opportune to submit an observation. For instance, if the 
policy area or the specific issue in the case is the subject of a strong domestic political 
debate, that can lead to pressure from the political level to submit an observation. In 
addition, the political perspective can influence the content of the observation, as a 
certain argument or a certain phrasing might be politically undesirable. In the theory 
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chapter of this thesis it was explained that Adam et al. posit that political considerations 
can be decisive for Member States in bringing an annulment action. The interviewees in 
this thesis indicate that if there would be a strong political desire to submit an 
observation in a preliminary reference case, even though it would be unnecessary from 
a strictly legal perspective, an observation would follow. However, they have not 
experienced such a scenario. 
 Another consideration that relates to what is in the observation, rather than the 
decision whether or not to submit, is that an effort is made to ensure that the Member 
State takes the same position across different EU institutions. In other words, the 
Member State should try to take the same position in the Court case as it did during the 
negotiations about the directive or regulation in question and in other Court cases. For 
instance, if the Member State argued for or agreed to the inclusion of a certain provision, 
it might have done so based on an assumption about the policy implications of that 
provision. Moreover, the Member State might already have adjusted its national law 
based on that assumption. When that provision then reaches the Court, the Member 
State will try to argue for the position on which it based its agreement with the inclusion 
of the provision in the directive. 
This is related to a further reason for submitting an observation, and that is the 
broader legal development in a certain policy area.106 This means Member States have 
an interest in how certain legal questions develop over time. One example of this is the 
strong Swedish interest in the principle of transparency. This issue is perhaps more 
prevalent in direct actions than in preliminary references. Nevertheless, several Swedish 
interviewees mentioned the furthering of transparency within the EU as a reason to 
submit observations. 107 This commitment to transparency can in and of itself motivate a 
Swedish submission: “transparency, that’s very important so if any case concerns this 
principle of transparency, we enter and defend it.”108 A relevant question when a 
Member State wants to submit an observation to influence broader legal developments 
is whether the case at hand is suitable to make the point it wants to make. This is a 
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question where the Foreign Affairs Ministry plays a role.109 As was said earlier, this 
neatly fits the repeat player model.  
A related, but broader, consideration is the question whether an important 
principle of EU-law or an important institutional question is at stake.110 This can apply 
to very broad EU-legal principles, but also to principles that are more specific to a 
certain policy area. If such a principled question reaches the Court, that can be a reason 
to submit an observation.  
The fact that the interviewees indicated that larger legal developments and 
principled questions are taken into consideration seems to contradict the 
neofunctionalist argument that Member States care most about the result in the 
individual case, while the Court focusses on long-term developments. Nevertheless, it is 
the case that the first thing most interviewees mention is the effect on national 
legislation and policy that already is in place. Moreover, this concern about national 
legislation seems to motivate most observations and seems to be the main concern of 
the interviewees. We will return to this issue in the section about the objectives of the 
civil servants below.  
 When it comes to reasons to not submit, the main one brought up by the 
interviewees was the availability of resources.111 As interviewee 6 puts it: “It’s also a 
question of resources because it takes a lot of time. So you can’t go in in every case, you 
have to pick the most important ones.”112 Naturally, this mainly plays a role in cases that 
are of lesser importance. Related to this is another factor, namely the confidence in the 
ability of the Member States that are going to submit. Interviewee 8 indicates that she 
sometimes worries that the Member State from which the case originates might present 
a weak case in court. This can be a reason to submit a supporting observation, or to 
coordinate and help the other Member State improve its arguments.113 Conversely, if the 
case is not very important to the Member State and many likeminded countries are sure 
to submit observations, maybe it is not so important anymore to submit something.  
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However, the dynamic might also be the opposite, as interviewee 7 says: “I think 
it’s important that, even though perhaps Germany and Holland and the UK are there, 
saying things in the Court, very much the same things that we are going to say, it’s a 
good point for the Court to see that there are many countries that will be affected, even 
though we are saying about the same thing. So it’s a way to show that this is not a small 
matter.”114 This latest point corresponds closely with what an intergovernmentalist 
scholar would say. Namely, that the more Member States show up on one side of the 
argument, the more likely the Court is to agree with them.  
  A final consideration that might shape the outlook of the observation is that 
several interviewees stated that it is ‘not done’ to write in an observation that another 
Member State’s legislation violates EU-law.115 One reason for this is that it is pretentious 
to believe one knows exactly how the legislation of another Member State works.116 
More importantly, the Member States will need each other again in other arenas in the 
EU and it is not good for the diplomatic relationship to lecture the other Member State 
on its own legislation. For instance, interviewee 8 says: “In principle we do not intervene 
against the fiscal legislation of other countries. Then we say: ‘the European Commission 
[can] fix that,’ because, my director general just sits around the table every month, or 
twice a month, with the directors general of the tax agencies of other countries. So you 
really do not like to get into an argument with your British colleague, if you need him for 
another political deal in Europe. So then you think: ‘well, you have that big Dutch 
company that is litigating, they have a whole army of lawyers, you have the European 
Commission who will say that this company is right.’ Those judges will also say this 
company is right without us directly picking a fight with our English colleagues.” 
Interviewee 8 goes on to say that if the Netherlands does not show up to support 
another Member State in tax cases, it is effectively a signal that the Netherlands thinks 
that Member State’s legislation is wrong. 
If this policy of not submitting observations against the legislation of other 
Member States is followed by all Member States, that could significantly affect the 
datasets used in statistical studies. It would skew the distribution of the Member States’ 
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positions in favour of the position of the Member State from which the case comes. 
Therefore, it would be harder for the Court to estimate the strength of the threats of 
override and noncompliance. However, Member States can, and sometimes do, not 
comment on the national legislation at stake and only on the interpretation of the EU 
rule.117 Another way around this concern is to comment on only some of the questions 
referred by the national court.118 However, this remains a diplomatically delicate course, 
as it might be clear what the consequences of the proposed interpretation would be. In 
sum, the data in this thesis is not enough to draw definitive conclusions on whether this 
factor significantly affects the results from statistical analysis. 
 In conclusion, the main factor that is considered by Dutch and Swedish civil 
servants when they have to decide about submitting observations to the CJEU is the 
effect the case will have on national policy, regulations, legislation, and discretion. A 
lesser role is played by political concerns, broader legal developments and principles, 
resource availability, and the role that other Member States will play in the proceedings. 
With regards to the content of the observations, two additional factors are sometimes 
considered. The first is consistency of the position across EU institutions. The second is 
that Member States do not submit observations that explicitly state that another 
Member State is violating EU law. Concerning these considerations, there are no clear 
differences between Sweden and the Netherlands or the various ministries. The only 
exception is that the fact that a lack of resources might hinder the submission of an 
observation was not mentioned by interviewees at the Foreign Ministries. This can be 
explained by the fact that the other ministries make the decision whether or not an 
observation will be made in cases in their policy area. The Foreign Ministries are not 
concerned with why the others choose not to submit an observation. 
 
4.2.2. Objectives  
Sub-question 3. What are the objectives that Swedish and Dutch civil servants seek to 
achieve with their observations and what do they believe their effect is on the rulings of the 
Court? 
 
All interviewees mentioned something along these lines as one objective: “it’s all about 
trying to influence the Court, the outcome of the case. In the end we want the Court to 
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give a certain answer to the questions posed by the national court.”119 For most 
interviewees, this is by far the most important and in some cases even the only objective. 
For these interviewees, success is when the Court agrees with their arguments. The 
reason the outcome of the case is most important is that it determines whether or not 
national legislation has to be changed. This is also why interviewee 1 identifies an 
outcome where the Court does not fully agree with the Swedish standpoint, but Swedish 
legislation does not have to be amended as a lesser form of success.120  
This answer points to an important caveat, namely that there are cases in which 
the reasoning of the CJEU is more important than the outcome in the specific case.121 
‘Outcome’ here means the final conclusion, e.g. ‘legislation A in Member State X violates 
Article P of the TFEU.’ The reasoning is the part of the ruling where the Court explains 
why this is the case. Interviewee 8 gave an example of why the reasoning matters. She 
referred to a Belgian case122 in which the question was whether the EU Treaties oblige 
Member States to prevent double taxation. Many Member States really disliked the 
Belgian legislation at hand and for that reason did not submit observations. In contrast, 
the Netherlands and some other Member States thought that it would be a bad outcome 
if the Court struck down the Belgian legislation at hand with the reasoning that the EU 
Treaties oblige Member States to prevent double taxation.123 Nevertheless, the 
reasoning of the Member States that did not submit an observation because they 
disliked the Belgian legislation corresponds with what neofunctionalism would predict: 
Member States care about the issue at hand, the Court about long term developments. 
However, as we saw earlier, and also in this case, concerns about legal principles and 
developments can be an important consideration for the Member States. 
 This can also be seen in a further objective, which was mentioned by five 
interviewees: the objective for the Member State to be a part of the general development 
of EU law.124 Since the Court’s jurisprudence develops over time and can have significant 
implications, it is important for Member States to use the opportunity they have to 
attempt to influence it. Furthermore, Member States can have an interest in the 
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development of specific legal questions. An example of a policy-specific objective is that 
Sweden seeks to make EU law more environmentally friendly.125 In the Netherlands an 
example that was mentioned is the objective to preserve broad national discretion in 
questions concerning direct taxation.126 These objectives fit the assumptions of the 
repeat player model from legal scholarship, as the Member States seek to achieve long-
term goals through their activity before the Court. However, as we saw earlier, the effect 
of the ruling on national legislation is the main concern. The broader policy objectives 
can be seen as secondary to that main concern. In addition, they can influence the 
content of the observation. 
 The objectives mentioned so far are centred on the Member States’ self-interest. 
In contrast, two Swedish interviewees127 referred to an objective that is not related to 
the interests of the Member State. This is the objective “to help the court, be a friend of 
the court and to say: ‘hey, you have this question, we have something interesting to say 
that you could, or could not, have as the basis for your judgement.’”128 This can even 
extend to cases from the own Member State: “it could also be that the question concerns 
Swedish legislation and then we see it as our duty to help the court get as clear a picture 
as possible, even if we don’t have any particular interest in the outcome or it’s not 
politically interesting.”129 This aspect of informing the Court was also brought up in 
other interviews. However, in those interviews it was with the reasoning that the 
information might influence the Court to decide favourably. In the event the Court would 
decide unfavourably, at least some solace might be found in the fact that Court decided 
based on the right information. In contrast, the idea of informing the Court as a self-
standing objective was mentioned by only two interviewees. 
 When it comes to the question what constitutes success in the eyes of the civil 
servants, the most common response is something along these lines: “Well, of course, it’s 
the outcome. (…) If the Court has especially listened to us, then that is fun to have, to be 
able to make our voice heard [in that way], but the outcome is more important.”130 This 
is by far the most important form of success, for all but one interviewee: to have the 
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Court rule your way, with a positive reference to your arguments as a pleasant “bonus 
point.”131 Again the caveat applies that the reasoning of the Court can be more important 
than the ruling in the concrete case. Interviewee 8 differed in her response. She 
expressed the opinion that success is “when the ruling of the Court is so (…) that it 
[gives] a workable solution. For instance [in the case] National Grid,132 the Court did not 
find in our favour, but it is a [ruling] with which we can work just fine, and it is also 
executable for the Tax and Customs Administration.”133 Interviewee 8 went on to state 
that it is not a problem to change Dutch legislation, as long as there is still room for a 
reasonable solution. However, this outcome might be seen by others as agreeable rather 
than a success, interviewee 11 confirms as much.134 
 The finding that success is mostly defined as the Court handing down a ruling 
that corresponds with what the Member State advocated for is perhaps unsurprising. It 
seems basic common sense that actors before a court are satisfied when the Court 
decides in their favour. Moreover, all three theoretical perspectives described in this 
thesis could predict this outcome, or at least the outcome is not incompatible with them.  
 Now we turn to the second part of sub-question 3, namely what Dutch and 
Swedish civil servants believe the effect of their observations is on the rulings of the 
Court. The first question is whether the observations affect the rulings of the Court at all. 
On this question the majority of the interviewees answered in the affirmative,135 while 
three of them either expressed scepticism or argued that it is very hard to tell.136 An 
interesting perspective on the influence of Member State observations on the Court can 
be found in this quote from interviewee 1: “that is really difficult to say, but without 
having the belief that they have an impact, well, there wouldn’t be any 
[observations].”137 This idea was also expressed by two other interviewees.138 This is 
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exactly what neofunctionalism fails to explain: why would Member States bother to 
spend time and energy writing observations if they do not have influence?  
However, most interviewees are uncertain how great the effect of their 
observations is, stating that it depends on the specific case how much influence one can 
have. Interviewee 7 for instance expressed the opinion that in cases in which it is legally 
very clear what the ruling should be, it does not make a difference if ten Member States 
are emphatically opposed to that ruling.139 Another question is how the interviewees 
know that their observations have an impact. The most cited way in which the 
interviewees see their influence is when the Court refers to the arguments they made in 
its reasoning, or incorporates a line of argument wholesale.140  
  The final question to be discussed in this chapter is how and why the 
observations affect the Court’s decisions, according to the interviewees. The most 
mentioned way through which the Court is influenced by Member State observations is 
that the Member States give the Court information about the context of the regulations 
or facts at hand and outline the effects certain rulings would have.141 In addition, the 
strength of the legal arguments that Member States use can also make a difference.142 
These answers strongly correspond with the perspective of legalism, as was expected. 
The idea that legal arguments and legally relevant information are the main channels 
through which the Court is influenced is very much the core argument of legalism. This 
perspective comes back clearly in some of the answers: 
FvS: “And does that work? Does the court listen to the observations so to 
say?” 
Interviewee 6: “Well, (…) [it] depends on the legal argument if we will win 
or not.”143 
 
However, these answers are in a way ‘normatively correct.’ Within legal scholarship and 
practice there is a strong norm that courts should be apolitical arbiters, who weigh the 
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arguments impartially. This could influence the results. However, as some of the 
answers presented below show, the interviewees are aware that reality is more 
complex. Despite that awareness, most of them still believe good argumentation that 
persuades the judges is the best way to influence the Court. Moreover, this sort of 
language of ‘winning the case’ and ‘defending national legislation’ comes back 
repeatedly throughout the interviews. It shows that the interviewees, especially at the 
Foreign Ministries, see their role as that of barristers. Some interviewees at the Swedish 
Foreign Ministry describe themselves explicitly as such.144 Moreover, the language of 
defending and winning cases shows a very lawyerly view of the process.  
In addition, several interviewees145 referred to the opinion of the Court on the 
accession of the EU to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).146 In this case, the Court ruled that the accession treaty 
by which the EU would join the ECHR violated EU law. With that decision the Court went 
against the opinion of the Advocate-General, the Commission, the European Parliament, 
the Council, and a whopping 24 Member States. This is not a preliminary reference, but 
several interviewees pointed to that case as proof that the Court is very independent 
and not afraid to go against the wishes of the Member States. However, this is only one 
case, so one cannot draw general conclusions from it. Nevertheless, it is relevant that the 
interviewees see the Court as very much willing to go its own way. This view of the 
Court might also explain the belief that arguments and information are the best way to 
persuade the Court, rather than any extra-legal political machinations. This is very close 
to the perspective of legalism.  
However, one aspect in the answers that more closely corresponds with 
intergovernmentalism is the idea that outlining the consequences of a possible ruling 
has an impact on the Court. In intergovernmentalist thinking, the idea would be that the 
Court would fear an override by the Member States if a sufficient amount of them would 
be opposed to a certain ruling. Therefore, the Court would avoid making that ruling. 
Another example that two interviewees brought up further strengthens the 
intergovernmentalist case. Interviewees 7 and 8 explain that in their view the Court has 
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changed its tune over the last ten years on the compatibility of direct taxation measures 
with the free movement clauses in the Treaties. In their view, the Court used to be 
strongly oriented towards the internal market. More recently however, the Court has 
become more lenient with Member States, since more Member States became active in 
these cases.147 This entails that the number of Member States that support the same 
interpretation or the same point of view could influence the Court.148 Nevertheless, as 
cited earlier, interviewee 7 stated that it does not matter how many Member States 
show up if the case is legally very clear.  
Moreover, an additional perspective that corresponds with 
intergovernmentalism is presented by interviewees 1 and 8. They argue that the Court is 
sensitive to politics. Especially interviewee 1’s point corresponds closely with 
intergovernmentalism. She argues that the political sensitivity of an issue, as expressed 
in the observations, influences the Court. However, she also states that knowledge of the 
political sensitivity does not mean that the Court follows it.149 The argument of 
interviewee 8 is that the Court responds to the general political atmosphere in Europe 
rather than to the political sensitivity of specific cases.150 Both these perspectives 
acknowledge that the Court is sensitive to politics and also makes legal-political choices, 
at least to some degree. This view corresponds with intergovernmentalism and goes 
against what legalists would say. However, there were only two interviewees that 
expressed this view.  
A final point about how the observations influence the Court is that five 
interviewees151 state that at the very least the Court has to consider the information and 
arguments they present in their observations and provide a reasoning if they disagree. 
This is why two interviewees152 expressed the idea that, as interviewee 11 put it: “so 
that is why you look: what goes wrong if we do not participate [in the case]?”153 This is 
not really an argument for why observations influence the Court, but rather an 
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expression of the fact that the Court has to, at the very least, consider all the opinions 
presented to it. 
 In sum, when it comes to objectives of the civil servants, what constitutes success 
for them, and their perspective on the influence of their observations on the Court, the 
answers were generally very similar across the different ministries in Sweden and the 
Netherlands. However, some answers were given by only a few interviewees. 
Nevertheless, there were generally no clear dividing lines between Sweden and the 
Netherlands or the different ministries. The only exception is that the interviewees in 
the Finance Ministries in both countries believe that the amount of Member States that 




5. Conclusion  
 
This thesis has looked at why civil servants in the Member States decide to submit 
observations to the CJEU. The main method was interviews with Dutch and Swedish civil 
servants. The research question, ‘Why do civil servants in Sweden and the Netherlands 
decide to submit observations to the CJEU?’, was divided into three sub-questions. The 
conclusions on those sub-questions will be considered in turn, after which an answer to 
the main research question will be formulated and suggestions for further research 
presented.  
 In short, the processes by which decisions about the observations are made are 
very similar in the Netherlands and Sweden. The Foreign Ministry distributes the cases 
to the other ministries. Those ministries decide whether they want to become active in a 
case and cooperate with the Foreign Ministry in drafting the observation. However, 
some differences between Sweden and the Netherlands were found that might explain 
why the Netherlands submits more observations than Sweden. The main candidate is 
the difference in manpower. The Netherlands has more manpower available for 
submitting observations in preliminary rulings, which could lead to more observations 
being submitted. This would correspond with the finding from earlier research that 
larger Member States, which are presumed to have more resources, submit more 
observations. However, the reason why the Netherlands has more resources is not fully 
clear, as the Netherlands is not very much larger than Sweden. It might therefore also be 
a difference in prioritisation, in addition to the difference in size of the countries. 
Secondly, the existence in the Netherlands of a checklist that is used to judge whether 
making an observation is desirable might play a role. Having to explicitly consider those 
questions for each case might lead to more observations being submitted. 
 The question to what extent the civil servants responsible for EU legislation are 
involved in the drafting of the observations is relevant for intergovernmentalism, this 
thesis argues. If such coordination exists it makes the idea of the observations being 
followed by an attempt to override the Court more plausible. It was found in this thesis 
that there is close coordination with the actors in the government who are responsible 
for implementing existing EU-legislation and negotiating new legislation. However, the 




unfavourable ruling by the Court, not an attempt to change EU law. This was true for 
both Treaty interpretation and interpretation of secondary legislation. Rather than 
being the first step of a legal-political strategy, the observations are seen, in some cases, 
as the last step, a final chance to argue for the favoured interpretation of a legislative 
compromise. This latter scenario fits the repeat player model from legal scholarship, as 
Member States seek rule change through litigation before the Court rather than through 
political manoeuvres against the Court. 
 That same repeat player model fits well with some of the answers from the 
interviewees on the cooperation between the Member States. With regard to important 
legal questions, civil servants have ongoing discussions across Member States. This can 
include close coordination spanning multiple cases on the same topic. This shows an 
interest in long-term legal developments, which fits the repeat player model and is 
rather incompatible with some tenets of neofunctionalism, namely that Member States 
mainly care about the case at hand. However, it should be noted that these instances of 
intense coordination are the exception rather than the rule. In general, coordination is 
mainly limited to drawing other Member States’ attention to important cases, 
exchanging information, and broadly sharing which Member States are on what side of 
the argument. On the issues of the coordination with other Member States and the actors 
responsible for EU legislation there are no clear differences between Sweden and the 
Netherlands. However, the Finance Ministries seem most active in coordinating with 
their counterparts in other Member States.  
 Now we turn to the conclusions on the second and third sub-questions in this 
thesis that deal with the considerations and objectives of civil servants with regard to 
submitting observations. In both cases, the overriding concern of the civil servants is to 
protect existing or forthcoming national legislation, regulations, policy, and practice. 
This is the main thing they consider when deciding whether to submit observations: 
what effects could a certain ruling in this case have on national legislation or policy? It is 
also the main objective they seek to achieve: influence the Court’s ruling in order to 
protect national legislation and policy. The Member States do not want to change their 
legislation or policy because this takes time and effort and because it might have 
undesirable policy and financial consequences. For this reason, when national legislation 




preliminary ruling to the CJEU, Sweden and the Netherlands in principle will submit 
observations. Similarly, if a case from another Member State concerns legislation that is 
very similar to the own legislation or a ruling in the case might limit national discretion, 
that is a reason to submit observations.  
 Considerations of secondary importance are political considerations, broader 
legal developments and principles, whether resources are available, and the role that 
other Member States will play in the proceedings. With regard to the content of the 
observation, as opposed to whether or not to submit one, two additional factors play a 
role. Firstly, Member States try to take the same position across different EU-fora. 
Secondly, Member States do not explicitly write in their observations that another 
Member State has violated EU-law. This latest factor might present a problem for 
statistical research, as it would complicate the Court’s assessment of the strength of the 
threats of override and noncompliance. 
When it comes to the factors taken into consideration when deciding whether or 
not to submit an observation there are no clear differences between the Netherlands 
and Sweden, or between the ministries. The only exception is that the availability of 
resources mainly plays a role at ministries other than the Foreign Ministry. 
 As mentioned above, the most important objective of the civil servants is to get 
the Court to rule their way. That is why it should not come as a surprise that nearly all 
interviewees define success as the instance when the Court follows the argumentation 
and conclusion that they have proposed. However, an important caveat is that the 
reasoning of the CJEU is sometimes more important than the ruling in the individual 
case. A secondary objective is for the Member State to be part of the general 
development of EU law, or of the legal development in a specific policy area. Finally, two 
interviewees saw it as an objective to be a friend of the Court and help the Court by 
providing useful information. However, this is decidedly a minority position.  
 The dominance of national interests in the consideration about whether or not to 
submit observations can be said to be compatible with all three of the theories discussed 
in this thesis. However, the attention the civil servants pay to larger legal developments 
does not fit comfortably with neofunctionalism. That does not mean that this thesis 
claims to disprove this theory. Rather, it shows that Member State behaviour is more 




Moreover, Stone Sweet and Brunell argue that the observations of the Member 
States do not constrain or influence the Court. This leaves unanswered why the Member 
States would submit observations at all. It is exactly this sentiment that several 
interviewees express: without the belief that they have some effect, there would be no 
observations. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the majority of interviewees believe their 
observations influence the Court. However, most interviewees are uncertain how much 
of an influence their observations have. When it comes to why the observations 
influence the Court the most common answer that the interviewees gave was that the 
observations can provide the Court with information on the national context, both legal 
and otherwise. In addition, the quality of the legal arguments that the Member States put 
forth also has an impact. This is a perspective that fits most with legalism, as its core 
argument is that legal arguments and legally relevant information are influential in 
Court proceedings and not political strength or preferences. 
However, some of the answers of the interviewees fit better with 
intergovernmentalism. The idea that sketching the consequences of a potential ruling 
influences the Court fits very well with intergovernmentalist thinking. In this view, the 
Court would see how many Member States do not want a certain ruling and how 
strongly they oppose its consequences. Based on that assessment the Court could 
estimate the severity of the threats of override and noncompliance. Another factor 
influencing the Court that corresponds with intergovernmentalism is the idea that the 
Court is attuned to politics. Similarly, two interviewees suggest that the amount of 
Member States submitting observations has some relevance, as it shows the Court that 
the issue at hand is important. Nevertheless, these last two points were minority views 
as both of them were expressed by only two interviewees. In contrast, with regard to the 
point about the number of Member States, several interviewees pointed to the example 
of the ECHR-accession case as evidence that the Court is very much independent and can 
go its own way no matter how many Member States show up. 
With regard to the objectives the civil servants seek to achieve, how they define 
success, and why the observations influence the Court, there are no clear differences 
between the Member States or the ministries included in this thesis. The only exception 
is that only the interviewees at the Finance Ministries indicated that the number of 




The research question of this thesis was: why do civil servants in Sweden and the 
Netherlands decide to submit observations to the CJEU? In short the answer is: to defend 
national interests, legislation, and policies. Naturally, the answer is more complex than 
that, but unfortunately one sentence cannot capture the full complexity of the answers 
this Master’s thesis has found.  
 In conclusion, the civil servants responsible for their Member State’s 
observations to the Court of Justice are very much lawyers, with a lawyerly worldview. 
They talk about ‘winning’ cases, some describe themselves as barristers, they believe 
legal argumentation and legally relevant information are the main things that influence 
the Court. This is why the perspective of legalism so often fits their answers. However, 
some of the interviewees also expressed views that more closely align with 
intergovernmetalist thinking. Nevertheless, these were minority views in every instance. 
A final judgement on the validity of the theories cannot be given based on the data in this 
thesis. However, neofunctionalism came out as the weakest of the three. This is perhaps 
unsurprising as this theory predicts that the work these interviewees do has no or very 
little impact. That is naturally an unattractive perspective and it is understandable that 
the interviewees do not share this view. 
 
5.1. Avenues for further research 
This thesis has only focussed on two Member States. This is naturally a limitation and 
further research could expand on this by looking at other Member States. Such research 
could look into whether the process is different in other Member States and whether the 
views of the Swedish and Dutch civil servants differ from those of civil servants in other 
countries. Similarly, for this thesis civil servants at only three ministries were 
interviewed. Further research could expand on this and include other ministries in the 
same or other Member States. For example, one could look at all ministries in a certain 
Member State or at one specific ministry across different countries.  
 Another way to look at the relationship of the Member States with the Court is to 
look at other procedures than the preliminary reference procedure. This could include 
Member State interventions in cases between the Commission and a Member State or 
between the EU institutions. In addition, one could also look at instances where Member 
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Appendix 1. Interview guide 
 
Possible follow-up questions are in brackets. The Dutch version can be found below. 
 
Process 
1. How is the decision-making about observations organised in the Dutch/Swedish 
government? (Where do you pick up on cases: when notified by the Court or earlier?) 
- What role does your department play in this decision-making process? 
- How many people deal with the observations to the CJEU in your department?  
2. Are there sometimes disagreements about sending an observation or the content of 
the brief between your department and the other departments involved?  
- If yes, what are these conflicts most often about? What are the dividing lines? 
3. To what extent is there coordination about submitting observations between those 
dealing with the Court and those dealing with new EU legislation or compliance with 
EU law? (What does this coordination look like? Who does it? When does it take 
place? How important is their input?) 
4. To what extent is there coordination with other Member States about submitting 
observations in specific cases? 
- What does this coordination look like? (Who does it? When does it take place? 
How important is the input?) 
- Are there Member States with whom there is more often coordination than 
with others? (Why these?)  
- What are the issues (e.g. policy areas, legal principles, legal arguments, 
technical issues) you most often coordinate? (Why these?) 
 
Specific cases154 
5. Could you give me an example of an important case that is now going on that your 
department is considering sending an observation in? 
- Why is this case important? 
- What are the considerations for sending or not sending an observation in this 
case?  
- Is there discussion on the content of the brief? 
- Who play a role? Who is important? 
 
Considerations 
6. In your view, why does Sweden/the Netherlands submit observations to the Court? 
7. From your experience, what are the factors that are taken into consideration when a 
decision is made whether or not to send an observation to the Court? 
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- A consideration might be a fear to alert the Commission to a compliance issue 
in your Member State. So, Member States would not send an observation in 
order to let sleeping dogs lie. Do you recognise that from your experience? 
8. What are the goals that Sweden/the Netherlands most often seeks to achieve with 
submitting an observation?  
- What counts as success? 
9. To what extent do you believe Member State observations have an influence on the 
decisions of the Court? (Why and how do they have influence?) 
 
Concluding question 
10. Those were all my questions, is there anything you would like to add on the subjects 
we discussed? 
 
The Dutch language interview guide: 
Proces 
1. Hoe is de besluitvorming rond schriftelijke opmerkingen georganiseerd in de 
Nederlandse overheid? (waar horen jullie van zaken, wanneer de notificatie komt, of ook 
eerder?) 
- Welke rol speelt uw departement in dit besluitvormingsproces? 
- Hoeveel mensen zijn er betrokken bij de schriftelijke opmerkingen aan het Hof 
in uw departement?  
2. Zijn er soms onenigheden tussen uw departement en andere betrokken departementen 
over het indienen en/of de inhoud van de schriftelijke opmerkingen? 
- Zo ja, waar gaan deze conflicten over? Wat zijn de scheidslijnen? 
3. In hoeverre is er coördinatie over het indienen van schriftelijke opmerkingen tussen 
degenen die betrokken zijn bij Hofzaken en degenen die betrokken zijn bij nieuwe EU-
wetgeving of uitvoering van EU-wetgeving? (hoe ziet die coördinatie er uit? Wie doet 
het, wanneer, hoe belangrijk is de input?) 
4. In hoeverre is er coördinatie met andere lidstaten over het indienen van schriftelijke 
opmerkingen in specifieke zaken? 
- Hoe ziet die coördinatie er uit? (wie doet het, wanneer, hoe belangrijk is de 
input?) 
- Zijn er lidstaten met wie er vaker wordt gecoördineerd dan met anderen? 
(waarom deze?) 
- Wat zijn de kwesties (beleidsgebieden, rechtsprincipes, juridische 
argumenten, technische kwesties) die het meest gecoördineerd worden? 
(waarom deze?) 
 
 Specifieke gevallen  
5. Kunt u een voorbeeld geven van een belangrijke zaak die nu gaande is en waarin uw 
departement overweegt schriftelijke opmerkingen in te dienen? 




- Wat zijn de overwegingen om al dan niet schriftelijke opmerkingen in te 
dienen? 
- Is er discussie over de inhoud? 
- Wie spelen er een rol? Wie zijn belangrijk? 
 
Overwegingen  
6. Waarom dient Nederland naar uw mening schriftelijke opmerkingen in bij het Hof? 
7. Naar uw ervaring, wat zijn de factoren die in overweging worden genomen wanneer er 
een beslissing wordt genomen om al dan niet schriftelijke opmerkingen in te dienen bij 
het Hof? 
- Een overweging zou kunnen zijn dat men de Commissie er niet attent op wil 
maken dat er een probleem in Nederland is met de implementatie van EU 
recht. Dus Nederland zou geen schriftelijke opmerkingen indienen om geen 
slapende honden wakker te maken. Herkent u dit uit uw ervaring? 
8. Wat zijn de doelen die Nederland het vaakst probeert te bereiken met het indienen van 
een schriftelijke opmerking? 
- Wat telt als een succes?  
9. In hoeverre gelooft u dat de schriftelijke opmerkingen van de lidstaten invloed hebben 
op de beslissingen van het Hof? (waarom en hoe hebben ze invloed?) 
 
Afsluiting 





Appendix 2. List of interviewees 
 
This is a list of the interviewees referred to in the thesis, the ministry at which they 
work. The English version of the names of the ministries is taken from their respective 
websites. 
- Interviewee 1, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet), Sweden 
- Interviewee 2, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet), Sweden 
- Interviewee 3, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet), Sweden 
- Interviewee 4, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet), Sweden 
- Interviewee 5, Sweden, asked that her workplace not be listed to further ensure 
anonymity 
- Interviewee 6, Ministry of the Environment and Energy (Miljö- och 
energidepartementet), Sweden 
- Interviewee 7, Ministry of Finance (Finansdepartementet), Sweden 
- Interviewee 8, Ministry of Finance (Ministerie van Financiën), the Netherlands 
- Interviewee 9, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken), the 
Netherlands 
- Interviewee 10, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken), 
the Netherlands 
- Interviewee 11, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (Ministerie van 





Appendix 3. Interdepartmental checklist 
 
Below is a checklist used in the Dutch government to determine whether making an 
observation is desirable. 
 
Source: Interdepartementale Commissie Europees Recht (ICER), juli 2002, Criteria voor 
het maken van opmerkingen in procedures bij het Hof van Justitie van de Europese 
Gemeenschappen, ICER 2002/56, 11 
 










1 Betreft het een prejudiciële verwijzing van een Nederlandse rechter?  
Is it a preliminary reference from a Dutch judge? 
  
2 Is de Nederlandse overheid procespartij in het geding voor de 
verwijzende rechter? 
Is the Dutch government a litigant in the case before referring judge? 
  
3 Leidt de zaak mogelijk tot aanpassing van de regelgeving van 
(departement)? 
Does the case potentially lead to modification of the regulations of 
(department)? 
  
4 Leidt de zaak mogelijk tot aanpassing van het beleid of de 
uitvoeringspraktijk van (departement)? 
Does the case potentially lead to modification of the policy or 
implementation practices of (department)? 
  
5 Leidt de zaak mogelijk tot aanpassing van concreet in voorbereiding 
zijnde regelgeving of voorgenomen beleid van (departement)? 
Does the case potentially lead to modification of forthcoming 
regulations or proposed policy of (department)? 
  
6 Kan de zaak leiden tot een inperking van de beleidsvrijheid op een 
kerntaak van (departement)? 
Could the case lead to a limitation of the discretion with regard to a 
core responsibility of (department)? 
  
7 Kan deze zaak in Nederland levende onduidelijkheden wegnemen 
over de juiste toepassing van de regeling? 
Could this case take away uncertainties in the Netherlands about the 
correct application of the regulation? 
  
8 Het betrokken beleidsterrein kan politiek gevoelig zijn. Daar kunnen 
twee verschillende vragen uit voortvloeien: 
The policy area in question could be politically sensitive. This may give 
rise to two different questions:  
  
8A Geeft beantwoording van de vragen van de checklist wel aanleiding 
voor het maken van schriftelijke opmerkingen, terwijl dat politiek 
niet wenselijk is? 





written observations, while that is politically not desirable? 
8B Geeft beantwoording van de vragen van de checklist geen aanleiding 
voor het maken van schriftelijke opmerkingen, terwijl dat politiek wel 
wenselijk is? 
Does answering the questions of the checklist not give cause for making 
written observations, while that is politically desirable?  
  
9 Zijn er mogelijk financiële gevolgen voor (departement) naar 
aanleiding van deze zaak, ook in de vorm van schadeclaims? 
Are there possible financial consequences for (department) as a result 
of this case, also in the form of damages?  
  
10 Kan de uitspraak in deze zaak, vanwege de in het geding zijnde 
regeling of vanwege de horizontale aspecten ervan, ook gevolgen 
hebben voor andere departementen dan alleen (departement)? 
Could the ruling in this case, because of the regulation at issue or 
because of its horizontal aspects, also have consequences for other 
departments than just (department)? 
  
11 Is er (zicht op) overeenstemming met andere departementen? 
Is there agreement with other departments (in sight)? 
  
12 Kan deze zaak gevolgen hebben voor het Europese beleid van 
Nederland? 
Could the case have consequences for the European policy of the 
Netherlands? 
  
13 Kan deze zaak leiden tot een belangrijke ontwikkeling in de Europese 
rechtsorde? 
Could this case lead to an important development in the European legal 
order? 
  
 Stelt u interventie voor? 







Appendix 4. Quotes in Dutch 
 
This is a list of the quotes in Dutch used in this thesis, listed in order of appearance. 
 
Page 31. 
English translation: “But in the end, whether we participate or not, there will be a ruling 
of the Court on the directive; or European law in any case. So, if that is not in line with 
your regulations then you will have to do something about it.” 
 Dutch: “Maar uiteindelijk komt er, of we nou meedoen of niet, een uitspraak van 
het Hof over de richtlijn; of het Europees recht in ieder geval. Dus als dat niet in 
overeenstemming is met jouw regelgeving dan zal je daar toch wat aan moeten doen.” 
 
Page 33. 
English translation: “[we do ask] ‘well, what is your position and are we in the same 
camp?’ so to say, but not ‘well, we have this argument are you also going to use that?’ I 
do try sometimes (…), [but] everyone has their own deadlines and their own way to go 
through that procedure nationally (…). So it is often hard [to coordinate] within those 
deadlines.”155 
 Dutch: “[we vragen wel] van ‘goh, wat is jullie standpunt en zitten we in hetzelfde 
kamp?’ zeg maar, maar niet van ‘goh, wij hebben dit argument, gaan jullie dat ook 
gebruiken?’ Ik probeer het af en toe wel (…) [maar] iedereen heeft ook weer zijn eigen 
termijnen en zijn eigen manier om die procedure nationaal te doorlopen (…). Dus vaak is 
het dan ook lastig om binnen die termijnen [te coördineren].” 
 
Page 35. 
English translation: “the question then actually is: ‘could a ruling have consequences for 
the interests, the practice, the legislation, the enforcement, the supervision of your 
ministry?’” 
Dutch: “het gaat er dan eigenlijk om: ‘kan een uitspraak gevolgen hebben voor de 
belangen, de praktijk, de wetgeving, de handhaving, het toezicht van jouw ministerie?” 
 
                                                          
155





English translation: “In principle we do not intervene against the fiscal legislation of 
other countries. Then we say: ‘the European Commission [can] fix that,’ because, my 
director general just sits around the table every month, or twice a month, with the 
directors general of the tax agencies of other countries. So you really do not like to get 
into an argument with your British colleague, if you need him for another political deal 
in Europe. So then you think: ‘well, you have that big Dutch company that is litigating, 
they have a whole army of lawyers, you have the European Commission who will say 
that this company is right.’ Those judges will also say this company is right without us 
directly picking a fight with our English colleagues.” 
Dutch: “In principe interveniëren wij niet tegen de fiscale wetgeving van andere 
landen. Dan zeggen wij van: “(…) de Europese Commissie [mag] dat opknappen,” want 
mijn directeur generaal zit gewoon iedere maand, of twee keer per maand, om de tafel 
met directeuren generaal van belastingdiensten van andere landen, dus je hebt helemaal 
geen zin om ruzie te krijgen met je Britse collega als je hem voor een andere politieke 
deal in Europa nodig hebt. Dus dan denk je van, nou ja je hebt nou dat grote Nederlandse 
bedrijf die is zelf aan het procederen, die hebben een heel legertje juristen, je hebt de 
Europese Commissie die gaat roepen dat dit bedrijf gelijk heeft. Die rechters die geven 
dit bedrijf ook wel gelijk zonder dat wij direct ruzie zoeken met onze Engelse collega’s. 
 
Page 43. 
English translation: “bonus point.” 
 Dutch: “bonus punt.”  
 
Page 43. 
English translation: “when the ruling of the Court is so (…) that it [gives] a workable 
solution. For instance [in the case] National Grid, the Court did not find in our favour, but 
it is a [ruling] with which we can work just fine, and it is also executable for the Tax and 
Customs Administration.”  
Dutch: “als de uitspraak van het Hof zo is (…) dat het een werkbare oplossing 




het Hof, maar dat is een [vonnis] waar wij prima mee kunnen werken, en het is ook 
uitvoerbaar voor de Belastingdienst.” 
 
Page 46. 
English translation: “so that is why you look: what goes wrong if we do not participate 
[in the case]?” 
 Dutch: “dus daarom kijk je van: wat gaat er mis als we niet meedoen [aan de 
zaak]?” 
 
 
